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and a little more than nine pages (203-12) to a discussion of the textual history of the Tafsir,
including the list of twenty-seven manuscripts "known to be extant." Unfortunately, the list
omits one of the earliest known manuscripts-Bibliotheque Nationale, Arabe 6962, dated
Suafi-Abad895 A.H.-which is easily available and was used by, among others, Paul Nwyia
in his edition of Simnani's introductionto the Tafsirin Al-Abhdth26 (1973-77): 141-57. As
for the discussion of textual history, one wonders why Elias keeps ignoring the evidence first
adduced by Corbin in Sayyed Haydar Amoli: La philosophie shi'ite (Tehran/Paris,1969, pp.
48-52), which leads to the conclusion that Simnani continued the Tafsirwritten from the beginning by Najm Razi, not Najm Kubrai-namely, Simnani's own statement to this effect in
the text of the Tafsiritself (ad Sura 54, M.S. B.N. Arabe 6962, 45a; MS. Beyazit 536, 13a).
Surely this passage is also found in the manuscript used by Elias. For further evidence, see
also William Shpall, "A Note on Najm al-Din al-Razi and the Bahr al-haqidiq," Folia Orientalia 22 (1981-84): 69-80.
These stricturesshould not detract from the intrinsic value of this timely monograph. It is,
on the whole, a very useful contribution to Simnani studies.
ROBERT
D. LEE,Overcoming Traditionand Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997). Pp. 224. $62.00 cloth, $18.00 paper.
REVIEWED
BY SHAHROUGH
AKHAVI,Department of Government and International Studies,
University of South Carolina, Columbia
Robert Lee, professor of political science at Colorado College, has written an engaging study
based on twenty years' serious reflection. He maintains that there is something called "authenticity" and that it can be identified in terms of both theory and practice. It inheres in all
civilizations, but its Europeanroots are his preferredstarting point, from the Greeks through
St. Augustine, Machiavelli, Descartes, Pascal, Locke, and Montesquieu. The debate over authenticity seems to have quickened with Rousseau, followed by Kant, Herder, Schiller, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Gramsci, Heidegger, and Sartre. In addition to these philosophers are a
brace of contemporaryWestern scholars writing in the past three decades, including but not
limited to Theodor Adorno, Lionel Trilling, MarshallBerman, and Charles Taylor.In the Third
World, authenticity is initially mostly associated with such African(ist)s as Fanon, Cesaire,
Senghor, and Nyerere. In the Islamic world, where Lee believes authenticity discourse is
monopolized by the radical Islamists, the IranianRevolution hastened an already developing
movement on its behalf. "Authenticists"in any civilization are out of the mainstreamof intellectual developments, Lee believes, but theirs are the most compelling perspectives. This
is as much due to the failings of false dichotomies (tradition and modernity, for one) as it is
to its own positive aspects.
Reading between the lines, it seems that it is perhaps easier to say what authenticity is not
than to articulate its features. It opposes the embracing of universals and is uncomfortable
with non-relativistic perspectives. Despite this, it somehow insists on certain commonalities
of human experience and is opposed to unmitigated subjectivism. As Lee elaborates the subject, it helps to view authenticity from at least two levels-the individual and the social.
"Individual authenticity means that I as a person should be who I am and not someone else"
(p. 1). At the communal level, it means that "societies must collectively set agendas that
reflect... the cultural heritage of their own peoples" (p. 1). Its advocates "reject Cartesian
rationality" and instead uphold "the existence of a mystical human bond deep beneath the
surface of things" (p. 2). Champions of authenticitydo not reject modernity,nor do they wish
to restore a vanished traditionalsociety; instead, they strive to channel the process of change
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in such a way that it is "comprehensible"and "productive of lifestyles people would recognize as spiritually as well as materially satisfying" (p. 7). They want "to break with essentialist notions of truth"but are unwilling "to part with the notion of truth altogether" (p. 13).
While some authenticists have advanced arguments within a religious frame, others have
retained an areligious outlook. All "authenticists" agree that "to be regarded as authentic,
action must reflect not universal moral judgments but individual choice within concrete circumstances"(p. 14). Hence, they startfrom a notion of the self as unique and enmeshed in particular circumstances. They believe that humans are diverse in their achievements, yet united
somehow by an underlying common bond. It is what humans do that is crucial-they make
their history and their world. Authenticists dismiss the dichotomies of tradition and modernity-tradition because it underminesthe reality that humanbeings make choices; modernity
because of the banality of secular rationalism with which it is so closely identified. Finally,
they believe that rampantindividualism, subjectivism, and relativism can be avoided by the
fact that individuals make choices within specific circumstances-as Taylor puts it, "in dialogue with other human beings" (p. 17).
These notions are fleshed out in two introductorychapters, titled "The Concept of Authenticity" and "Authenticityin EuropeanThought."The book's core consists of individualchapters
on four Muslim thinkers whom Lee believes are exemplary authenticists: MuhammadIqbal
(d. 1938), Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), 'Ali Sharicati(d. 1977), and MohammadArkoun (b. 1928).
Not surprisingly,at least in this reviewer's opinion, Lee is most successful with Iqbal and Arkoun (both of whom were and are deeply steeped in Europeanphilosophy and social science).
The discussion on Shari'ati is also apposite, although his knowledge of Western social theory
and philosophy was quite superficial,and his theory of change a gerry-builtconstruct that borrows too facilely from Western sociology without examining its underlying structuresof explanation. The treatmentof Qutb, in my view, is less successful. Still, open-minded observers
will find much that is persuasive in Lee's arguments about the social thought of all of these
writers.
Some readers of this journal may wonder at juxtapositions such as Kierkegaardand Iqbal,
Nietzsche and Shari'ati, Parsons and Qutb. But Lee's purpose is to show what makes his
Muslim thinkers authenticists, and no doubt Western writers have done much to elaborate
authenticity'scentral concepts-namely, "particularity,""radicalism,""autonomy,""unicity,"
"equality,"and "institutionalization."Lee is respectful of these thinkers'ideas while still asking probing questions. Perhapsthe one major question under which all his others may be subsumed is: "how do you four thinkers propose to realize your project?" In Lee's opinion,
institutionalizationis the most nettlesome issue for them all. In developing his categories and
assessing how Iqbal, Qutb, Shari'ati and Arkoun measure up, Lee takes us into difficult terrain, but we are rewarded by his interesting insights and cogent ways of examining a large
number of complex issues.
Lee does well to start with Iqbal, who was known for insisting upon knowledge of the self
as a preliminaryto knowledge about the world. Iqbal'simpatience with mere imitation of tradition (taqlid) and his rejection of Westernizationmake him a prime candidate for Lee's analysis. The self-realization of the individual, for Iqbal, was the requisite for the regenerationof
human beings everywhere, and, to him, the genius of the Prophet's ummah was its creative
solution to the problems of the 7th century. It is this spirit, ratherthan that era, that needs to
be recaptured.For this reason, Iqbal, says Lee, was a revolutionary,a characterizationthat is
reinforced by Iqbal'swillingness to entertainviolence as a means to break throughto the kind
of society that would provide full liberty to Muslims.
As noted earlier, I disagree with Lee on Qutb. In my view, Qutb is a scripturalistwho made
ad hoc and episodic references to human beings making their history and to the need to adapt
their beliefs to changing circumstances. Lee refers mainly to Qutb's This Religion of Islam
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(originally published in 1962) to uphold the idea that Qutb believed that the individual is an
autonomous actor. However, in terms of Qutb'stheory of society as derived from the overall
thrust of his oeuvre, I believe that his unit of analysis, the motor force of history, is not the
individual but Islam, an entity that he repeatedlypresents as a reified entity (not unlike Hegel's
"Geist"). For all Qutb'sreferences to Islam as a practical religion (by which he means people
should practice it, not just think about it), I am convinced that it is not homo faber (man the
maker) who lies at the center of his theory,but Allah, "Who knows and you do not know."Lee
relies on William Shepard'sarticle in Die Welt des Islams (1992), "The Development of the
Thought of Sayyid Qutb,"to justify the notion that Qutb focused on the individual in history.
In my opinion, though, this begs the question. Indeed, by regarding Muslims to have been
living in a state of jahiliyyah for so many centuries since the 7th century, Qutb in effect advocates a restorationof Medinan Islam. Those who believe that this was not what Qutb held
ought to show how, then, it can be that generation after generation of Muslims over the long
centuries failed to get it right, as Qutb sees it; yet, supposedly in the face of their repeatedfailures, all he requires them to do to finally become "valid" Muslims is reach into the recesses
of their spirituality and live their Islam correctly. In my view, Qutb'smessage is that it is precisely Muslims living in historical time and attemptingto actuate their beliefs who have failed
to be true to their faiths. What they must do, accordingly, is transcend history and be swept
up into an immemorial hypostatization-an Islam of which Qutb is the gatekeeper. Qutb may
have made ad hoc references to historical stages, but when one reconstructs his theory, real
history appears to have stopped at 661 A.D. (with a possible resuscitation between 717 and
720-the brief caliphate of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz). Lee says at one point:
Qutb thought in terms of stages of realization. The revelations received in Mecca entreated
Muhammad and his followers to reconsider their relationship to the universe; at a second
stage, in Medina, God pushed them to organize a community . . . [which] achieved enormous
successes, before monarchy replaced divine sovereignty. The monarchical phase [i.e., after
661 A.D.], emergent from the early successes, produced decadence but also pointed the way
toward revival [p. 96].
Whether Qutb truly believed that the phase since 661 has "pointed the way toward revival"
is moot. In any case, it certainly has not broughtMuslims into line with the teachings of their
God, in Qutb's opinion. In fact, Qutb fully believed that the centuries-long "monarchical
phase," ratherthan producing a revival, has generatedjdhiliyyah.
Lee's discussion of Arkoun is one of the great strengths of this book. Arkoun is a Berber
who is emeritus professor of Islamic thought and formerdirectorof the Instituteof Arabic and
Islamic Studies at the Sorbonne (III). He also writes in French and is a chevalier of the Legion
of Honor. Lee has, in fact, at Arkoun's own request, translated into English Arkoun's book
Overtures sur l'Islam (1989, 1992) under the title, RethinkingIslam (1994).
Arkoun, influenced by Foucault and other post-modernists, demands the historicization of
Islamic thought-to show that it is the productof people in actual historical times and places.
The problem is that a particular version of Islamic thought has been sanctified as a consequence of developments in the late classical period, and especially due to the influence of
al-Shafi'i (d. 820). Ever since, Muslims have been prisoners of categories of meaning standardizedcenturies ago, whereasthe genius of the early Muslims was that they themselves were
able to adapt to changing historical circumstances by interpretationsthat differed from those
held by their predecessors. Another difficulty is that Shafi'ian and Ash'arite epistemologies
are entrenchedbecause of the cooperation among political regimes, establishment ulama, and
dissident clerics/populists, all of whom fear that abandoningthe ahistorical approachto knowledge will lead to their marginalizationin society. Yet, without the careful applicationof critical
methodologies from modern philosophy, social science, and linguistics, Muslims will always
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have to gravitate within the orbit of a closed cognitive system that is increasingly irrelevant
to their contemporaryneeds. If this sounds a lot like Muhammad'Abduh'sefforts on behalf
of ijtihad, that is because Arkoun writes within the tradition identified with that reformer.
Arkoun'sopponents,such as the EgyptianMuslim BrotherMuhammadal-Ghazzali,with whom
he had a public debate, cannot easily dismiss him as a Westernizerbecause Arkoun has himself criticized Western Orientalism and also because he is a scholar who has solid grounding
in Islamic studies, including a substantial study of al-Miskawayh (d. 1030).
Lee writes that Arkoun conceives of the Qur'an at a variety of levels: "(1) a set of revelations . .. ; (2) a diverging set of recitations in the newly emergent Arab Empire;(3) a written
text developed in an effort to reduce diversity and solidify Arab rule; (4) a foundation for a
corpus of codified law designed to unify the judicial practice of a multiethnic, multilingual
empire; and (5) a reflection of universal truth as revealed to the Arabs" (p. 148). He laments
that it is the last two levels of understandingthat have dominated and produced a hegemonic
fiqh today. Let us think the unthinkable (I'impensable), says Arkoun, by which he means let
us stop thinking in terms of unchanging substances and essences; let us abandon the glorification of idealism, with its timeless categories such as truth and beauty and reason. Such
glorification has given the Muslims a kalam that is overwhelmed with considerations of
Allah's attributes,whereas Muslims are in need of a cognitive system that will allow them to
live in the world as fully liberated believers in tawhid.
But Arkoun cannot square the circle-his reliance on science as the way out of the authenticist's dilemma is finally unconvincing to Lee. Arkoun believes science can reveal the diversities and multiplicities of humanexistence, beliefs, and thought. How can it do so? Through
the "constantly revised principles and methods of objective knowledge" (p. 163). Yet how is
one to know whether one is making progress or, indeed, retrogressing,queries Lee, if there is
no permanentstandardby which to judge? Not only this, but Arkoun is too utopian in expecting intellectuals to do the heavy-duty work of reconstructing Islam and then persuade the
masses to accept their final product.
In fact, the thought of all four Muslim thinkers has shown the "Elusiveness of Authenticity," as Lee titles his concluding chapter.The desire for authenticity is a desire for new foundations, but how does one know when one has created them? As Lee puts it, "the search for
authenticityultimately founders on this point of validation, which Islam cannot provide. Islam
cannot validate a particularreading of Islam" (p. 194). Philosophy is a way out, though these
writers are suspicious of a rationally driven philosophy. Meanwhile, there are many Islams,
and significant gaps among the world's cultures exist. The problems in overcoming such gaps
are great, but in the interim we should thank Lee for his importantefforts to elucidate many
of the key issues.
DAN COHN-SHERBOK,
Medieval Jewish Philosophy: An Introduction (Richmond, Surrey:
Curzon, 1996). Pp. 205.
REVIEWED
BYALFREDO
FABIOBORODOWSKI,
Departmentof Philosophy, Jewish Theological
Seminary, New York, N.Y.
Introductions,whether in the form of books or academic courses, typically lie at one of two
extremes. Either they offer a merely superficial survey of the subject, or they make the kind
of incisive statement that can be made only by those few who have mastered many aspects of
a subject and are hence able to grasp and convey its principles. In the case of academic
courses, the extremes are manifested in the persons of those chosen to teach them. Some uni-

